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SURVEY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT, JUDGMENT
ON THE PLEADINGS AND RELATED
PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURES*
Harold L. Korn
Gerald E. Paleyt
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment procedures provide for a hearing at an early
stage in the litigation to ascertain whether there is any triable issue of
fact or whether one or the other of the parties is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.' The parties are enabled, by this device, to pierce
the formal allegations of the pleadings through the use of affidavits or
other written proof setting forth the evidentiary facts underlying their
respective claims. If the proof offered discloses a genuine factual issue,
the summary judgment is denied and the action is tried in the ordinary
manner.
2
The summary judgment, and judgment on the pleadings, formerly,
the demurrer, have always been valuable legal short cuts to avoid
expense and delay. Today, when court calendars are impossibly
crowded, and trial costs steep, their value is all the more apparent.
This article will try to answer some of the many questions dealing with
the availability and application of the summary judgment, judgment
on the pleadings and related procedures.
Necessary Criteria
The statutes and rules set forth varying formulations of the criteria
for deciding whether a trial is necessary,3 but the test depends, in the
* This article is adapted from the study prepared for the Advisory Committee on Practice
and Procedure of the New York State Temporary Commission on the Courts. The study was
prepared under the direction of the reporter, Professor Jack B. Weinstein, of Columbia Law
School. The authors were Harold L. Korn, director of research, and Gerald E. Paley, research
assistant.
t See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 519, for biographical data.
1 For a discussion of the history of various summary judgment provisions, see Clark, Code
Pleading § 88 (2d ed. 1947); Millar, Civil Procedure of the Trial Court in Historical
Perspective 237-52 (1952); Vanderbilt, Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration
219-20 (1949); Bauman, "The Evolution of the Summary Judgment Procedure," 31 Ind.
L.J. 329 (1956); Millar, "Three American Ventures in Summary Civil Procedure," 38 Yale
L.J. 193 (1928); Clark and Samenow, "The Summary Judgment," 38 Yale L.J. 423 (1929).
2 If the motion is denied and leave to defend is given, some rules provide it may be given
unconditionally or subject to such terms as to giving security or time or mode of trial or
otherwise as the judge may think fit. N.J. R. Civ. P. 4:58-5; Eng. Rules of the S. Ct., 0.
14, r. 6. (The Annual Practice 1956).
3 See, e.g., West's Ann. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 437c (1954) ("if it is claimed that there is
no defense to the action or that the action has no merit, . . . judgment may be entered ...
unless the other party ... shall show such facts as may be deemed ... sufficient to present
a triable issue of fact."); Conn. Prac. Book § 53 (1951) (if plaintiff shows there is "no
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last analysis, upon the court's own understanding of what constitutes
a genuine factual issue. Thus, an uncommonly restrictive interpreta-
tion has recently been advanced in a number of federal decisions holding
that a bare allegation in a pleading is sufficient to raise an issue, even
though no attempt is made to meet the affidavits and other evidentiary
matter offered to controvert the allegation. 4 These decisions, thwarting
the purpose of summary judgment to ieach the factual basis behind the
pleadings, have prompted the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules
to propose an amendment which would, in effect, overrule them.5
Although the summary judgment procedure is designed primarily to
expose spurious questions of fact, it frequently appears on the hearing
that a decision of a question of law would completely dispose of the
controversy. In England, if an arguable legal question exists, the
application must be denied and leave to defend given.' In American
defense to the action," summary judgment will be granted unless defendant shows "such
facts as may be deemed by the court sufficient to entitle him to defend") ; Mass. Ann. Laws
c. 231, § 59B (1956) ("unless the defendant by affidavit, by his own evidence or otherwise
shall disclose such facts as the court finds entitle him to defend") ; Eng. Rules of 'the S. Ct.,
0. 14, r. 1. (The Annual Practice 1956) (if plaintiff states that there is no defense to the
action, summary judgment shall be granted unless the defendant shall satisfy the judge "that
he has a good defense to the action on the merits or shall disclose such facts as may be
deemed sufficient to entitle him to defend the action generally . . ").
A proviso in the Massachusetts rule, however, seems to limit the effect of its summary
judgment procedure as a device for avoiding trial: "Judgment as aforesaid shall be entered
at the expiration of seven days from the order (for immediate entry of judgment] unless the
defendant in the meanwhile files a demand for trial; and if such demand is filed as aforesaid
the case shall be advanced for speedy trial." Mass. Ann. Laws c. 231, § 59B (1956). See
Norwood Morris Plan Co. v. McCarthy, 295 Mass. 597, 605, 4 N.E.2d 450, 455 (1936).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) provides:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.
The provisions of the following jurisdictions are substantially the same as the federal rule:
Ariz. Code Ann. § 21-1212 (1939); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann., R. Civ. P. 56 (1953); 13 Del.
Code Ann., Ct. Rule 56 (1953); 30 Fla. Stat. Ann., R. Civ. P. 1.36 (1956); Ky. Prac. &
Serv. R. Civ. P. 56 (Baldwin 1956); Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 110, § 57 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1956);
3 Md. Ann. Code 4873, Gen. Rules Prac. and Proc., Summary Judgment Rule 1 (1951);
Minn. R. Civ. P. 56, 232 Minn. Rep. (1952) ; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1332 (Cum. Supp. 1955) ;
Nev. R. Civ. P. 56; N.J. R. Civ. P. 4:58; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-1-1 (56) (1953); Tex. Ann.
Rules, R. Civ. P. 166-A (1955); Utah Code Ann., R. Civ. P. 56 (1953); Va. Code Ann., Rules
of S. Ct. of Appeals, Rule 3:20 (Supp. 1956) ; Wis. Stats. § 270.635 (1951).
4 E.g., Chappell v. Gottsman, 186 F2d 215 (5th Cir. 1950); Frederick Hart & Co. v.
Recordgraph Corp., 169 F.2d 580 (3d Cir. 1948); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Metals Disintegrat-
ing Co., 8 F.R.D. 349 (D.N.J. 1948) (following but strongly disapproving the rule stated in
the text), aff'd, 176 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1949).
5 The proposed amendment to rule 56(e) provides:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule,
an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific
facts showing that there is genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
See Report of Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure 56-59 (Oct. 1955);
Wright, "Rule 56(e): A Case Study on the Need for Amending the Federal Rules," 69 Harv.
L. Rev. 839 (1956); Jenner and Tone, "Pleading, Parties and Trial Practice," 50 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 612, 621 (1955) ; 41 Iowa L. Rev. 453, 454 (1956).
6 Eng. Rules of the S. Ct., 0. 14, r. 6. (The Annual Practice 1956).
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jurisdictions, however, there is a greater emphasis on preliminary dis-
position wherever a trial is unnecessary, and this requires that the
courts be permitted to decide such questions upon the motion for sum-
mary judgment. Thus, the Michigan rule explicitly states that the
court may enter judgment if it finds the movant entitled thereto "as
a matter of law, without deciding any controverted question of fact."7
And in Connecticut, if the court finds that the "only question or ques-
tions arising are bonafide questions of law," the defendant may file
within ten days "a pleading appropriate to test such" question of law."
Failure to file the pleading or to prevail thereon results in judgment for
the plaintiff. While the rules in most other jurisdictions do not explic-
itly treat the matter, it seems that the usual practice is to consider the
determination of questions of law as within the province of the summary
judgment hearingY
Type of Action in Which Summary Judgment Is Available
A large number of American jurisdictions, following the lead of the
federal rules, have made the summary judgment procedure applicable
in any type of civil action. The states that presently have such broad
provisions are Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Ken-
tucky, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia and Wisconsin.' The
proposed Louisiana Code of Practice contains a summary judgment
provision modeled on the federal rule, but a Louisiana policy requiring
7 6A Mich. Comp. Laws Annotations, app. 4, Court Rule 30, § 7 (1948).
8 Conn. Prac. Book § 55 (1951); see Clark and Samenow, "The Summary Judgment,"
38 Yale LJ. 423,441, 471, n. 326 (1929).
9 See, e.g., Coutts v. J. L. Kraft & Bros. Co., 119 Misc. 260, 261, 196 N.Y. Supp. 135, 137
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1922), aff'd without opinion, 206 App. Div. 625, 198 .Y. Supp. 908
(2d Dep't 1923) (summary judgment provision applicable "even though an important
question of law had to be determined"); Chairmasters v. Public National Bank & Trust Co.,
283 App. Div. 704, 127 N.Y.S.2d 806 (1st Dep't 1954); Orange County Trust Co.
v. Merchant's Acceptance Corp., 279 App. Div. 689, 107 N.Y.S.2d 925 (3d Dep't 1951), appeal
dismissed, 303 N.Y. 900, 105 N.E.2d 487 (1952); Ware v. Heller, 63 Cal. App. 2d 817, 148
P.2d 410 (1944); Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Casaday, 15 Cal. App. 2d
163, 59 P.2d 444 (1936) ; Millar, Civil Procedure of the Trial Court in Historical Perspective
245 (1952). -Cf. L. R. Munoz & Co. v. Savannah Sugar Refining Corp., 118 Misc. 24, 193
N.Y. Supp. 422 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1922).
10 Ariz Code Ann. §8 21-1210-16 (1939); West's Ann. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 437c
(1954); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann., R. Civ. P. 56 (1953); 13 Del. Code Ann. Rule 56 (1953);
30 Fla. Stat. Ann. R. Civ. P. 1.36 (1956) ; Ky. Prac. & Serv., R. Civ. P. 56 (Baldwin 1956) ;
Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 110, §§ 57, 101.15, 101.16 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1956) ; 3 Md. Ann. Code 4873,
Gen. Rules Prac. and Proc., Summary Judgment Rule 1 (1951); Minn. R. Civ. P. 56, 232
Minn. Rep. (1952); Neb. Rev. Stats. §§ 25-1330-36 (Cum. Supp. 1955); Nev. R. Civ. P.
56; N.J. R. Civ. P. 4:58; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-1-1 (56) (1953); ND. Rev. Code § 28-0911
(1943); Texas Ann. Rules, R. Civ. P. 166-A (1955); Utah Code Ann., R. Civ. P. 56 (1953) ;
Va. Code Ann., Rules of S. Ct. of Appeals, Rule 3:20 (Supp. 1956); Wis. Stats. § 270.635
(1951). For a discussion of the Colorado rule, see Morris, "Judgment," 23 Rocky Mt. L.
Rev. 581, 585 (1951) ; for a discussion of the Illinois rule, see Jenner and Tone, "Pleading,
Parties and Trial Practice," 50 Nw. L. Rev. 612 (1955).
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full proof in marital litigation would prevent the granting of a summary
judgment in such cases."
Of the jurisdictions allowing summary judgment only in certain
actions, England has the broadest provision. Through a steady process
of addition, its coverage now extends to all actions except libel, slander,
malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, seduction, breach of promise
to marry or a claim based on an allegation of fraud.' 2 New York's rule
113,13 through a similar series of amendments, has been made available
in nine enumerated classes of action including, as its most recent
addition, the declaratory judgment suit.
Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan and Rhode Island limit the scope
of the procedure to actions on a debt or liquidated demand arising out
of a negotiable instrument or contract,' 4 and Connecticut adds to these
a suit to recover specific chattels or certain real property.'5 The jur-
isdictions with the most restricted rules provide for summary procedural
devices only in actions against specified officers for certain defaults-
for example, against sheriffs, coroners, clerks, judges of probate, tax
collectors and attorneys at law for defaults such as failure to pay over
money collected and failure to return an execution. These rules gener-
ally include provision for judgment on motion by sureties against their
principals or co-sureties. 16
11 Summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings cannot be entered in Louisiana "in
any action for divorce, separation from bed and board, or annulment of marriage, nor in any
case where the community, paraphernal or dotal rights may be involved in an action between
husband and wife." Proposed Article 36, Pleading, quoted in McMahon, "Pleading Under
the Proposed New Louisiana Code of Practice," 28 Tul. L. Rev. 216, 228 (1954).
12 Eng. Rules of the S. Ct., 0. 14, r. 1 (The Annual Practice 1956). See, for a discussion
of the English rule, Odgers, Pleading and Practice 57 et seq. (1955).
13 N.Y. R. Civ. P. 113.
14 Iowa Code Ann., R. Civ. P. 237 (1951); Mass. Ann. Laws c. 231, § 59B (1956) (limited
to actions on a contract where plaintiff seeks to recover a debt or liquidated demand); 6A
Mich. Comp. Laws Annotations, app. 4, Court Rule 30, § 1 (1948) (limited to actions on a
contract, judgment or statute). RI. Gen. Laws c. 524, § 1 (1938) (limited to actions for
a debt or liquidated demand in money). Cf. West Va. Code Ann. § 5524 (1955) (motion for
judgment by any person entitled to recover money on any contract).
15 Conn. Prac. Book § 52 (1951).
16 Ala. Code Ann. tit. 7, §§ 591-623 (1940) (summary judgment); Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 29-
201-10 (1947) (summary judgment); Iowa Code Ann., R. Civ. P. 239 (1951) (summary
judgment); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 1430, 1842 (1942) (judgment on motion); Mo. Ann. Stats.
§ 433.070 (1951) (judgment on motion by surety against principal); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 6-2
(1953) (summary judgment for official fees); Okla. S. Ct. R. 31, 204 Okla. Rep. x (1951)
(motion for judgment on supersedeas bond); Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 12, R. Civ. P. 1098 (Purdon
1951) (summary judgment for mandamus; at any time after the complaint is filed, the court
may enter judgment if the right of the plaintiff thereto is clear, but the judgment may be
opened upon cause shown); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 25-301-45 (1955) (judgment on motion);
Wash. Rev. Code § 6.08.060 (1951) (judgment against sureties on motion). See, for a dis-
cussion of the Pennsylvania rule, Wright, "Modem Pleading and the Pennsylvania Rules,"
101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 909, 936-37 (1953); Amram, "A Reply to Professor Wright," 101 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 948, 956 (1953); Graubart, "A Rejoinder From Pennsylvania," 101 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 959, 965 (1953).
In some states such provisions exist together with summary judgment rules of general
application. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 418.005 (Baldwin 1955) and note 10 supra.
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Parties Who May Be Granted Summary Judgment
Federal rule 56 and the many rules based upon it state that a party
seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain
a declaratory judgment may move for summary judgment. These rules
have been construed to allow any claimant, including a third-party claim-
ant, an intervenor, or a claimant in interpleader to make the motion.' 7
They also allow the party defending against any such claim to move for
summary judgment in his favor. In England, Connecticut and Massachu-
setts only the plaintiff or claimant can move for summary judgment.'
Some of the state provisions expressly provide that summary judg-
ment may be granted to the party opposing the motion rather than the
movant, where such a disposition is warranted, without the necessity of
a formal cross-motion. 9 Other rules allow judgment only in favor of the
moving party.' Federal rule 56 does not cover the point, but the weight
of authority on federal practice supports the former position2' and there
is now a proposed amendment to the federal rules which would explicitly
state that "summary judgment, when appropriate, may be rendered
against the moving party.
2 2
Time of Motion
One state, Rhode Island, allows a plaintiff to move for summary
judgment together with his declaration of claim. Apart from Rhode
Island, the earliest time at which a motion is permitted is when the
defendant has appeared in the action. The jurisdictions so providing
are England, Connecticut and Massachusetts, where the summary judg-
ment procedure is available only to plaintiffs, and Texas, which allows
either party to move after the defendant has appeared. Other states,
including New York, do not allow the motion until after answer24 and
some specify any time after the cause is at issue. 5
The federal courts, and those states that have followed the federal
rules, allow the claimant to move for summary judgment at any time
17 See 6 Moore, Federal Practice 2045 (1953).
18 Conn. Prac. Book § 53 (1951); Eng. Rules of the S. Ct., 0. 14 (The Annual Practice
1956); Mass. Ann. Laws c. 231, § 59B (1956).
V) West's Ann. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 437c (1954); 3 Md. Ann. Code 4874, Gen. Rules
Prac. and Proc., Summary Judgment Rule 4 (1951); Wis. Stats. § 270.635 (1951). For a
general discussion of the problem, see Annot., 48 A L.R.2d 1188 (1956).
20 Mass. Ann. Laws c. 231, § 59B (1956); Va. Code Ann. Rules of S. Ct. of Appeals,
Rule 3:20 (Supp. 1956).
21 See 6 Moore, Federal Practice 2088-91 (1953).
22 See Report of Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure 56 (Oct. 1955).
23 RI. Gen. Laws c. 524 § 1 (1938).
24 West's Ann. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 437c (1954); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1330 (Cure. Supp.
1955); N.Y. R. Civ. P. 113.
25 6A Mich. Comp. Laws Annotations, app. 4, Court Rule 30, § 1 (1948); Va. Code
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after the expiration of twenty days from the commencement of the
action, or after the service of a motion for summary judgment by the
adverse party. The defendant, under these rules, may move at any
time. 6 Considerable discussion has centered about the federal time
provision, and the present rule represents a compromise between the
conflicting views. As the rule was originally promulgated, the claimant
could not move for summary judgment until after the responsive plead-
ing had been served. Under that arrangement, it was felt that the
defendant's recourse to the pre-pleading motions, with a corresponding
extension of time to answer, would unduly postpone the plaintiff's oppor-
tunity to move for summary judgment. This objection had particular
force before 1948, when two rounds of pre-pleading motions were per-
mitted, the first being directed solely to the court's jurisdiction. On the
other hand, it was thought undesirable to allow the plaintiff to move for
summary judgment too soon-before the defendant had time to secure
counsel and determine his course of action; accordingly, a proposed
amendment allowing a claimant to move at any time after commence-
ment of the action was not adopted." The twenty-day provision, finally
adopted in 1946, affords the defendant a sufficient period to determine
his course of action. The period is shortened when the defendant moves
for summary judgment before twenty days, for, in that case, he is
presumably prepared and there is no reason to delay plaintiff's motion.28
Supporting and Opposing the Motion
The usual form of presenting proof on a motion for summary judg-
ment is by affidavit. A few jurisdictions provide that both parties must
file affidavits, others require them only of the movant,30 and the major-
ity, following federal rule 56(a) and (b), explicitly provide that neither
party is required to submit affidavitsY1 In the latter jurisdictioris, the
court may consider, in addition to the pleadings and affidavits, any
depositions, written admissions or other documentary evidence submitted
by the parties.
Federal rule 56(e) codifies the generally accepted doctrine that affi-
davits must be made upon personal knowledge by a party competent to
Ann., Rules of S. Ct. of Appeals, Rule 3:230 (Supp. 1956).
26 E.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), 56(b); Ariz. Code Ann. § 21-1210 (1939); Colo. Rev. Stat.
Ann., R. Civ. P. 56 (1953).
27 See Clark, Code Pleading § 88 n. 221 (2d ed. 1947).
28 See 6 Moore, Federal Practice 2007-08, 2043-45 (1953).
29 West's Ann. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 437c (1954); Conn. Prac. Book § 53 (1951); Iowa
Code Ann. R. Civ. P. 238 (1951).
30 Mass. Ann. Laws c. 231, § 59B (1956); Wis. Stat. § 270.635 (1951); Eng. Rules of the
S. Ct., 0. 14, r. 1 (The Annual Practice 1956).
31 E.g., Arizona, Colorado and New Mexico provisions, cited in note 10 supra.
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testify, and must set forth only such facts as would be admissible upon
a trial. Rule 56(g) allows the court to penalize a party who presents
affidavits "in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay." The rules
require payment to the other party of the reasonable expenses, including
attorney's fees, which the filing of the affidavits caused him to incur, and
any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Rule 56(f) provides relief for an opposing party who, for good reason,
is unable to support his opposition by affidavit, for example, where the
facts or access to them are exclusively within the knowledge or control
of the movant. It permits the court either to deny the motion, or order
a continuance for discovery, or make "such other order as is just."
Similar provisions also appear in many of the states. 2
It is safe to assume that the court's interrogation of the parties or
their counsel may play a considerable part in its decision, although the
rules generally make no explicit provision for proof other than by
written evidence. The English rule, a notable exception, provides as an
alternative to opposing the application by affidavit, that "the Judge may
allow the defendant to be examined upon oath."33 And an apparently
unique North Dakota provision allows the court to strike out a pleading
and enter judgment on the basis of its examination of the parties during
a pre-trial hearing. 4 The most widespread recognition of oral question-
ing is in the common provisions discussed in the next section, which
convert a summary judgment motion not granted in toto, into a form of
pre-trial hearing, and allow the court to eliminate unsubstantial issues
"by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interro-
gating counsel." (Emphasis added.) 5
Partial Summary Judgment
The majority of summary judgment provisions allow the motion to be
granted on the issue of a defendant's liability even if a genuine issue
requiring a trial as to the amount of damages exists3 6 In addition, most
32 E.g., Arizona, Colorado, Delaware and Utah provisions, cited in note 10 supra. See
Millar, Civil Procedure of the Trial Court in Historical Perspective 246-48 (1952). Unlike
federal rule 56(f), which applies only to the opposing party, the Illinois and Michigan rules
allow either party to seek a continuance to procure proof then unobtainable. Ill. Ann. Stat.
c. 110, § 101.15 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1956); 6A Mich. Comp. Laws Annotations, app. 4, Court
Rule 30, § 6 (1948).
Maryland does not provide the contempt sanction contained in federal rule 56(g). 3 Md.
Ann. Code 4875, Gen. Rules Prac. and Proc., Summary judgment Rule 5 (1951).
33 Eng. Rules of the S. Ct., 0. 14, r. 3 (a) (The Annual Practice 1956).
34 NI). Rev. Code § 28-0911 (1943).
When from the examination of an adverse party before trial as provided in this title it
shall appear to the satisfaction of the court that such party does not have a valid claim
or defense and that his pleading has been interposed in bad faith, the court may strike
out such pleading and may order the entry of judgment as upon default.
35 Fed. R. Civ.P. 56(d).
36 E.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Ariz. Code Ann. § 21-1210 (1939). Contra, Va. Code Ann.,
Rules of S. Ct. of Appeals, Rule 3:20 (Supp. 1956).
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jurisdictions make provision for partial summary judgment. These
provisions fall into two classes. The first, typified by Rule 114 of the New
York Rules of Civil Practice, goes no further than to allow the granting of
a summary judgment as to one or more of several causes of action, or a
separable part of a single cause, with the remainder of the action being
severed. 7 Most of these rules contemplate the immediate entry of a judg-
ment on the part determined before trial,38 sometimes on terms imposed
by the court.39 Thus, England provides that the judge may suspend
execution of the judgment.40 Illinois sets out specific alternatives in the
event a motion for partial summary judgment is granted: the court may
postpone entry of the judgment, enter it immediately, or enter it and
stay enforcement pending determination of the remaining issues in the
case.4 California, at the other extreme, specifically provides that partial
summary judgment shall not be entered until termination of the remain-
der of the action.42
The second group, in addition to allowing this kind of partial
judgment, requires the court, whenever practicable, to make an order
specifying all facts that exist without substantial controversy."3 These
provisions, drawn from Federal rule 56(d), seek to salvage as much as
possible from the hearing in the way of eliminating unsubstantial issues
when summary judgment is denied or granted only in part." The judge
who heard the motion, having gained considerable familiarity with the
case, is in an excellent position to ascertain the real issues; the procedure
achieves all the advantages of a pre-trial hearing without the necessity
of any further expenditure of time or effort by the court or parties.
Appeal
Although a grant of full summary judgment is appealable everywhere,
a grant of partial summary judgment is not usually considered a final
37 N.Y. R. Civ. P. 114; Conn. Prac. Book § 54 (1951) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 110, §§ 57, 101.116
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1956); 6A Mich. Comp. Laws Annotations, app. 4, Court Rule 30, § 5
(1948) ; Eng. Rules of the S. Ct., 0. 14, r. 4 (The Annual Practice 1956).
38 See Clark, Code Pleading § 88 (2d ed. 1947).
39 E.g., Conn. Prac. Book § 54 (1951); 3 Md. Ann. Code 4873 (1951) (providing that
the court retains jurisdiction of the action even though the disputed part is below its
jurisdictional amount if the original claim was within its jurisdiction).
40 Eng. Rules of the S. Ct., 0. 14, r. 4 (The Annual Practice 1956).
41 I1. Ann. Stat. c. 110, § 101.16 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1956).
42 West's Ann. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 437(c) (1954).
43 Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, Texas and Utah. These provisions are cited in note 10 supra.
The new Illinois rule, Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 110, §§ 57, 101.16 (Smith-Hurd Supp: 1956),
although otherwise substantially the same as federal rule 56, omits this provision. It was
eliminated because of the fear that it invited encroachment upon the right to trial by jury or
court on evidence adduced in open court. Jenner and Tone, "Pleading, Parties and Trial
Practice," 50 Nw. U.L. Rev. 612, 620-21 (1955).
44 See 6 Moore, Federal Practice 2295 (1953).
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order or judgment and hence is not appealable4 5 So, too, a denial of the
motion is a non-final order from which no appeal may be taken. 6 The
rules would be otherwise in jurisdictions allowing appeal from interme-
diate or interlocutory orders 7 California specifically allows appeal from
the grant of a partial summary judgment even though the judgment may
not be entered until termination of the remainder of the action.4
OTHER ACCELERATORY PROCEDURES PRELIMINARY TO TRIAL
Many pre-trial procedural devices, while not eliminating the need for
a trial, serve to expedite and simplify litigation. They serve primarily
to speed up the early stages of an action which subsequently goes
through the course of litigation. Although these devices will not be dealt
with, they are, for example, pre-trial hearings and free disclosure. On
the other hand, procedures like summary judgment are designed to
accelerate judgment and at the same time, avoid the delay caused by
long trial calendars, and the trouble and expense of a trial.
The most common of the latter procedures is, of course, the motion,
or other device for challenging the legal sufficiency of a pleading. This
will be treated later in this article. The present section treats other,
somewhat less common, procedures for securing a speedy disposition.
The most important of these is a method for raising objections based on
facts outside the pleadings by a preliminary motion to dismiss supported
by affidavits. This procedure, like summary judgment, usually fails if
a genuine issue of fact requiring a trial appears. Some jurisdictions,
however, go a step further and provide for a preliminary trial on the
issue raised by such motion, or place the whole case on a special short
calendar when it appears that the trial will require only a short time.
Certain devices which expedite the process and pleading stage will
also be considered, although they do not provide for a preliminary
disposition, because they are often thought of as useful supplements to
the summary judgment procedure. 9
45 See id. at 2299-2314; Clark, Code Pleading 562 (2d ed. 1947).
46 See, e.g., Eng. Rules of the S. Ct., 0. 14, r. 1 (The Annual Practice 1956); 6 Moore,
Federal Practice 2302, 2318-23 (1953).
47 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 274.33(3) (1951) (section dealing with appealable orders) ; Clark,
Code Pleading 564 (2d ed. 1947).
48 West's Ann. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 437(c) (1954).
49 A number of similar devices that have been used in continental countries are described
in Bauman, "The Evolution of the Summary Judgment Procedure," 31 Ind. LJ. 329 (1956).
Among these is an early French executory procedure whereby a defendant was preduded
from asserting any defenses except those particularly specified, such as payment, release or
extension of time. However, this summary method was limited in scope to actions on public
documents evidencing a liquidated demand.
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Pleading Devices
Virginia early adopted a method for instituting suit by a motion for
judgment with notice in place of a writ and a complaint. This procedure,
originally limited to specified actions calling for dispatch, proved highly
successful and was continuously expanded.5 Today, an action in Vir-
ginia may be commenced by filing a motion for judgment in the clerk's
office in "all civil actions at law in a court of record seeking a judgment
in personam for money only," and in certain other enumerated actions at
law.5 ' If the defendant does not file a responsive pleading within twenty-
one days after service on him of the notice of motion for judgment, he
is in default. If issue is joined, however, the defendant then has the
right to a jury trial.5 2 This procedure, however, provides no device for
disposing of unfounded defenses; 5' its value lies chiefly in the liberal
approach to pleadings that it has engendered in the courts. Although
the notice must state a good cause of action, there is a complete absence
of any requirement of formality; it is viewed by the courts as an act of
the parties rather than of their attorneys.54 Aside from this advantage,
a claimant may often proceed by notice of motion when it is too late to
mature a regular action in a given term of court.55 Due to its unquali-
fied success in Virginia, several other jurisdictions have provided notice
of motion for judgment procedures of more limited application.56
England has recently adopted a provision, order 14B, allowing a
plaintiff to apply for trial without pleadings.57 The application must be
50 See Bauman, supra note 49 at 343; Fowler, "Virginia Notice of Motion' Procedure,"
24 Va. L. Rev. 711 (1938); Millar, "Three American Ventures in Summary Civil Procedure,"
38 Yale L.J. 193, 217 (1928).
51 The provision applies to "all civil actions at law in a court of record seeking a judg-
ment in personam for money only (except when a tax refund is sought), actions for establish-
ment of boundaries, ejectment, unlawful detainer, detinue and declaratory judgments (when
at law), including cases appealed or removed to such courts from inferior courts, whenever
applicable to such cases." Va. Code Ann., Rules of S. Ct. of Appeals, Rule 3:1 (Supp. 1956).
52 Va. Code Ann. § 8-211 (Supp. 1956).
53 This may be accomplished by resort to Virginia's broad summary judgment provisions.
Va. Code Ann., Rules of S. Ct. of Appeals, Rule 3:20 (Supp. 1956).
54 Security Loan & Trust Co. v. Fields, 110 Va. 827, 67 S.E. 342 (1910); see Fowler,
supra note 50 at 732 et seq.; Clark & Samenow, "The Summary Judgment," 38 Yale LJ. 423,
464 (1929).
55 See Millar, "Three American Ventures in Summary Civil Procedure," 38 Yale L.J.
193, 221 (1928).
56 The procedure is available in West Virginia in all contract actions and in actions against
a surety. West Va. Code Ann. §§ 4308, 5524 (1955). Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri,
Tennessee and Washington also have provisions for judgment on motion in a limited class
of actions. See note 16 supra. The early "bank notice" procedures of Alabama and Mississippi
were provisions in bank charters allowing them to sue their debtors by means of notice and
motion rather than the usual common law method. See Millar, "Three American Ventures in
Summary Civil Procedure," 38 Yale L.J. 193, 215 (1928).
57 Eng. Rules of the S. Ct., 0. 14B (The Annual Practice 1956). This procedure is avail-
able in all cases in which summary judgment is available, with the exception of claims
based on negligence, nuisance or breach of duty where damages are sought for either personal
injuries or damage to a vehicle from a road accident. See Bauman, supra note 49 at 340 et
seq.
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made after the defendant has appeared in answer to a writ of summons
accompanied by a notice that the plaintiff intends to apply for an order
for trial without further pleadings. It is made by serving a summons
and an affidavit which summarizes the questions believed to be in issue,
and states the reasons for contending that the case is suitable to be tried
without pleadings. The defendant then files an affidavit summarizing his
defense and his reasons for opposing the application. The plaintiff may
file an affidavit in reply. If, on hearing the application, the judge or
master is satisfied that the case can properly be tried without further
pleadings, he orders the affidavits to stand as pleadings and gives other
directions concerning subsequent proceedings as he deems necessary. If
he denies the application, the summons is dismissed and costs are
assessed against the plaintiff. The defendant's time to deliver his defense
then runs from the date of the dismissal.58
The Evershed Report, which advocated the adoption of order 14B,
asserted that the new procedure would result in a substantial saving of
time and expense. 9 It was suggested that the fact that the claim and
defense must be under oath, and that the.parties are brought before the
master at an early stage in the proceedings, would compel early dis-
closure of the nature of each party's case and would discourage the
raising of formal issues which have no substantial basis in fact. Odgers
states that because of this, little use has thus far been made of the
procedure. He contends that affidavits are a poor and costly substitute
for pleadings as a means of formulating the issues.60 And he points out
that a simpler procedure is available to a plaintiff who thinks that plead-
ings are unnecessary: under order 20, rule 1, he may indorse his writ
generally but in sufficient detail to disclose the nature of the dispute
and apply to the master to dispense with the statement of claim."'
Motions to Dismiss Supported by Affidavits
The motion to dismiss, which has replaced the demurrer in most code
states, generally may not be supported by affidavits. The ancient pro-
hibition of the "speaking demurrer" persists, and the motion reaches
only defects (and sometimes affirmative defenses) that appear on the
face of the pleading.62 An objection based on facts outside the pleading
must wait until trial, or until a motion for summary judgment can be
made if that procedure is available.
58 See Odgers, Pleading and Practice 75-78 (1955).
59 Final Report of the Committee on Supreme Court Practice and Procedure 34 (1953).
60 Odgers, Pleading and Practice 78 (1955).
61 Ibid. See Eng. Rules of the S. Ct., 0. 20, r. I(b) (The Annual Practice 1956).
62 E.g., Ryan v. Knights of Columbus, 82 Conn. 91, 72 Ati. 574 (1909); State ex rel.
Moriarty v. Smith, 72 Conn. 572, 45 At. 355 (1900) ; Haag v. Bloom, 121 Pa. Super. 529, 184
At. 467 (1936) ; see Clark, Code Pleading § 80 (2d ed. 1947).
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Illinois, Michigan and New York have adopted provisions permitting
a motion to dismiss on certain specified objections, which may be sup-
ported by affidavits and hence based on facts outside the pleadings.6 3
The specified grounds represent objections which, if sustained, are dis-
positive of the action. They are:
(1) lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter;
(2) lack of jurisdiction over the person (except in New York);
(3) plaintiff's lack of capacity to sue;
(4) pendency of another action;
(5) former judgment;
(6) statute of limitations;
(7) release;
(8) statute of frauds;
(9) non-accrual of the cause of action because of defendant's infancy
or other disability.
Michigan adds the defense of assignment or other disposition of the
cause of action by the plaintiff before suit, and Illinois permits attacks
where the claim is barred by "other affirmative matter."
As on a motion for summary judgment, the court may grant the
motion if no genuine issue of fact requiring a trial is presented. 4 Even
if a genuine issue exists, the Illinois and Michigan provisions allow the
court to try the issue immediately upon the proof presented for the
motion if the right to jury trial is not involved; but if a jury trial is
rightfully demanded in apt time, the motion must be denied without
prejudice.6 5 If the motion is not determined on the merits, the defense
may be raised in the answer.
The New York rule provides that the issue may be determined by the
court, by a jury, or by a referee, but the cases hold that where the
defendant is constitutionally entitled to a jury trial, the issue must be
decided by a jury. 6 The trial is only as to the specific issues raised on the
motion. The court has the additional alternative of overruling the
motion and letting the defendant plead the facts in his answer.
Preliminary and Short Cause Trials
Under the provisions just discussed, it is possible to obtain a prelim-
inary trial of the specified defenses and an accelerated judgment even
63 Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 110, § 48 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1956); 6A Mich. Comp. Laws Annota-
tions, app. 4, Court Rule 18 (1948); N.Y. R. Civ. P. 107, 110.64 See Millar, Civil Procedure of the Trial Court in Historical Perspective 250-52 (1952).
65 See Note, 33 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 191 (,1955).
66 Garfunkel v. Malcolmson, 217 App. Div. 632, 217 N.Y. Supp. 32 (1st Dep't 1926);
Herzog v. Brown, 217 App. Div. 402, 216 N.Y. Supp. 134 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 243 N.Y. 599,
154 N.E. 622 (1926).
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though a genuine issue of fact exists which would defeat a motion for
summary judgment.
A similar procedure exists in California, permitting the court, upon
the motion of either party, to proceed to the trial of specified defenses
before the trial of any other issue in the case. The grounds for invoking
the California provisions are "that the action is barred by the statute
of limitations, or by a prior judgment, or that another action is pending
upon the same cause of action, or ...any other defense not involving
the merits of the plaintiff's cause of action but constituting a bar or
ground of abatement to the prosecution thereof .... 
If the movant is unsuccessful on the trial of the narrow issue, the
action proceeds in the ordinary manner and usually another trial will be
necessary for the remaining issues in the case. It appears that the fear
of two trials has induced some reluctance on the part of the courts to
invoke these provisions, and they are not frequently used.6"
A different approach to the problem of summary determination of
genuine issues of fact is found in the English summary judgment pro-
vision. When leave to defend is given, but the master is of the opinion
that the trial will not exceed three hours, 9 the case is set down on a
Short Cause List. In practice it is often found that the defeidant's
affidavit on the motion for summary judgment has made the real issues
clear and rendered further pleadings unnecessary. The usual form of
the resulting order is to grant leave to defend on the condition that the
action be tried in the Short Cause List, with restrictions against raising
any new defense or counterclaim not raised by the defendant's affidavit,
unless notice, if given within four days of the date of the order or leave,
is granted by the court. The order may also provide for the exchange
of lists of documents and inspection of such documents."0 Generally, a
case which contains a substantial counterclaim will not be put on the
Short Cause List. Even if the action is not placed on this list, after an
unsuccessful motion for summary judgment, the master may order
that the affidavits stand as pleadings, instead of requiring separate
pleadings.71
67 West's Ann. Cal. Code Civ. Prac. Proc. § 597 (1954).
68 See Rizzuto v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 213 App. Div.
326, 210 N.Y. Supp. 482 (2d Dep't 1925); Gordon v. Pushkoff, 67 N.Y.S.2d 873 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1946), aff'd without opinion, 272 App. Div. 872, 72 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1st Dep't
1947); see also Comment, 3 U.C.L.AL. Rev. 72, 83 (1955).
69 The Evershed Committee proposed that the figure be set at two hours. Final Report
of the Committee on Supreme Court Practice and Procedure 33 (1953).
70 See Eng. Rules of the S. Ct., 0. 14, r. 8 (The Annual Practice 1956); Final Report,
supra note 69 at 33.
71 See Final Report, supra note 69 at 34.
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JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
As we have seen, the summary judgment may facilitate a speedy dis-
position of a case and avoid the sometimes exorbitant cost of a trial.
Similarly, a judgment on the pleadings, or similar provisions, may
accomplish this end.
The tendency of modern procedure is to abolish the demurrer as a
means of raising objections of law to the pleadings. The change usually
takes one of two courses: the substitution of the motion for judgment,
as in New York, or the substitution of the objection in law in the
responding pleading, as in England." However, many American juris-
dictions have abolished the demurrer only in name and substituted a
motion which, due to similarity and precedent, is treated in the same
way. Indeed, Professor Millar suggests that the change of name alone
is detrimental, and regards the restoration of the demurrer in Pennsyl-
vania as highly significant. 3 Due to the modern freedom of amendment,
he points out, the old harshness of the demurrer is gone, and since a
motion to strike, to dismiss, for judgment or the like, which has replaced
it, may proceed on many grounds other than legal insufficiency, the net
result is a loss in exactness and clarity of procedural thinking.
This sort of criticism, however, is directed only at the typical code
procedures, providing various motions under which objections to a
pleading are decided immediately and without resort to any proof out-
side the pleading. The present federal and English systems are quite
different and have remedied many of the defects of the codes.
The English Practice
The emphasis of the English practice is to place legal objections to a
pleading in the responsive pleading, and postpone their determination
until the trial of the whole action. The demurrer has been abolished74
and all objections in law must be made in the responsive pleading. These
questions are to be decided by the judge at or after the trial unless both
parties consent, or one party obtains a court order, that they be heard
and disposed of before the trial.75 However, objections to service, juris-
diction of the court,76 venue, 77 joinder of parties 78 and joinder of causes
72 See Clark, Code Pleading § 86 (2d ed. 1947); Millar, Civil Procedure of the Trial
Court in Historical Perspective 170 et seq. (1952).
73 Millar, op. cit. supra note 72 at 187 et seq.
74 See Eng. Rules of the S. Ct., 0. 25, r. 1 (The Annual Practice 1956).
75 Id., 0. 25, r. 2.
76 Defendant may make a conditional appearance within the required time and move to set
aside the writ because of improper service or lack of jurisdiction. Id., 0. 12, r. 30; see notes
to id., 0. 12, r. 1. See also Odgers, Pleading and Practice 9, 52 (1955). The court may,
if necessary, stay the proceedings and try the question of jurisdiction as a preliminary point.
Id. at 55.
77 Eng. Rules of the S. Ct., 0. 36, r. 1 (The Annual Practice 1956).
78 Id., 0. 16, rr. 11-12. A motion objecting to the joinder of parties may be made at any
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of action7 9 may still be raised by motion.
As a rule, the court will order a hearing before trial only if it thinks
that the objection raises a serious question of law which, if decided in
favor of the party objecting, would dispense with the need for any trial,
or at any rate with the trial of some substantial issue in the action.
Such an order should be made only with respect to matters which would
not be further clarified at a trial, and it should not be made where there
are facts in dispute; if so made, it may be set aside at the hearing. As
an alternative, the court may order that the points of law be dealt with
before any other matters at the trial.
If the preliminary determination of a point of law substantially dis-
poses of the whole action or of any distinct cause of action, ground of
defense, set-off, counterclaim or reply, the action may be dismissed or any
other just order made. If the objection is upheld but the court thinks
an amendment could cure the defect, it may give the losing party leave
to amend, but will make him pay the costs of the argument.8 0
A second method of attacking the opposing party's pleading is by
application to the court to strike out the pleading on the ground that it
discloses no reasonable cause of action or answer, or that it is frivolous
or vexatious. If the attack is successful, the judge may order that the
action be stayed or dismissed, or that judgment be entered accordingly,
as may be just.8 This is a much more summary procedure than that of
the objection in law and is appropriate only when the legal insufficiency
of the pleading is so plain and obvious as to admit of no hesitation in
recognizing it.82 Affidavits may not be used under this rule. The court
also has inherent jurisdiction to strike a frivolous pleading and to that
end may receive evidence by affidavit. In either case, the court may
give leave to amend the pleading so as to cure the defect.8 3
The Federal Practice
The federal rules take a compromise position. They allow certain
objections in point of law to be raised either by motion, or in the
stage of the proceedings. However, no cause may be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or
nonjoinder of parties and the court may deal with the matter in controversy as far as regards
the rights and interests of the parties actually before it. See Odgers, Pleading and Practice
14 (1955).
79 Any defendant alleging that the plaintiff has united in the same action several
causes of action which cannot be conveniently disposed of together, may at any time
apply to the court or a judge for an order confining the action to such of the causes
of action as may be conveniently disposed of together.
Eng. Rules of the S. Ct., 0. 18, r. 8 (The Annual Practice 1956); see Odgers, Pleading and
Practice 29 (195'5).
80 Eng. Rules of the S. Ct., 0. 25, r. 3 and notes (The Annual Practice 1956).
81 Id., 0. 25, r. 4.
82 Id., 0. 25, r.1, notes; Millar, Civil Procedure of the Trial Court in Historical Perspective
172 (1952).
83 Eng. Rules of the S. Ct., 0. 25, r. 4, notes (The Annual Practice 1956).
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responsive pleading, and let the court decide whether or not they
should be heard and determined before the trial.84 Rule 7(c) abolished
demurrers, pleas and exceptions for insufficiency of a pleading. Sub-
divisions of rule 12 provide for a motion for a more definite statement8 5
and a motion to strike "any insufficient defense or any redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter"; 86 and after the plead-
ings are closed, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.8 7
Further, rule 12(b) states:
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required,
except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be
made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack
of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of
process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable
party. A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before plead-
ing if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived
by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a respon-
sive pleading or motion. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which
the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, he may
assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief.88
The seven defenses specifically enumerated, whether made in a plead-
ing or by motion, and the motion for judgment on the pleadings "shall
be heard and determined before trial on application of any party, unless
the court orders that the hearing and determination thereof be deferred
until the trial." 9
Rule 12 seeks to encourage the quick and simultaneous presentation
of defenses and objections. Therefore, a party may join in one motion
all of the defenses and objections specified in the rule that are then
available to him without waiving any of them. However, if he makes
a motion and does not assert all of the available grounds, he may not
subsequently raise any others by motion, thus preventing a series of
motions.90 He may still assert any defense or objection not raised by
motion in his responsive pleading, but any that one not raised either by
84 A good number of states have adopted the federal provisions or some modification
thereof. See, e.g., 13 Del. Code Ann., Ct. Rule 12 (1953); 30 Fla. Stat. Ann., R. Civ. P. 1.11
(1956); N.J. R. Civ. P. 4:12-2 et seq.
85 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).
86 Id. 12(f).
87 Id. 12(c).
88 Id. 12(b).
89 Id. 12(d).
90 Id. 12(g) ; see 2 Moore, Federal Practice 2260-64, 2322-26 (1948).
Originally, subsection (g) allowed defenses numbered (1) through (5) in subsection (b) to
be raised before the motion raising defense (6) which, in turn, could be raised before the
answer. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g) (rev. ed. 1944). This procedure, with its successive rounds
of motions, continued the delays and preliminary sparring characteristic of the old plea in
abatement, demurrer and plea in bar. See Clark, "Simplified Pleading," 27 Iowa L. Rev.
272, 284 (1942).
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motion or in the responsive pleading are deemed waived, except failure to
state a claim or defense, failure to join an indispensable party and lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. 1
The Advisory Committee on Federal Rules has recommended that the
motion for a more definite statement should be treated separately and
not operate as a waiver of the right to make subsequent motions, because
the defendant is entitled to have a comprehensible complaint before he
is called upon to deal with its legal sufficiency.92
Professor Moore states that motions to raise "matters not within the
coverage of rule 12, may continue to be made and are not subject to
the requirements of rule 12 as to consolidation and waiver."93 The cases
cited, however, involved only motions for a stay or for security for
costs; the decisions point out that such matters are not defenses,
objections or grounds of abatement and that motions raising them are
therefore not inconsistent with the spirit or objective of rule 12.14 Other
decisions have expressly stated that the defenses which may be inter-
posed by motion are confined to those enumerated in rule 12(b).15
It has been held that indefiniteness of complaint and illegality of the
means by which evidence is procured in civil suits are not grounds for
a motion to dismiss,96 and although a number of decisions have allowed
the statute of limitations to be urged by motion,9 7 some of them specifi-
cally reason that this defense is within rule 12(b) (6), failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. 8 The objection of forum
non conveniens, however, is addressed to the discretion of the court and
may be raised at any time before or after answer. 99
Rule 12 expressly provides for a speaking motion only for the objec-
tion of failure to state a claim and the motion for judgment on the
91 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h).
92 See Armstrong, Report of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Recommending Amendments, 5 F.R.D. 339, 343 (1946); Clark, Experience Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Reporter's Summary of Suggestions, Criticisms and
Published Discussions 25 (May 1, 1953).
93 2 Moore, Federal Practice 2243-44 (1948).
94 Butler v. Judge of U.S. Dist., etc., 116 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1941) ; Parker v. Trans-
continental and Western Air, 4 F.R.D. 325 (Wi). Mo. 1944); Green v. Gravatt, 35 F. Supp.
491 (W.D. Pa. 1940); Wheeler v. Lientz, 25 F. Supp. 939 (W.D. Mo. 1939).
95 Bowles v. Glick Bros. Lumber Co., 146 F.2d 566, 568 (9th Cir. 1945); see Tinnerman
Products v. Adel Precision Products Corp., 62 F. Supp. 348, 351 (D. Va. 1945) (dictum).
90 Bowles v. Glick Bros. Lumber Co., 146 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1945); Bowles v. Superior
Uniform Cap & Shirt Mfg., 146 F.2d 652 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 877, rehearing
denied, 326 U.S. 804 (1945).
97 Fouts v. Fawcett Publ., 116 F. Supp. 535 (D. Copn. 1953); Henis v. Compania
Agricola De Guatemala, 116 F. Supp. 223, aff'd, 210 F.2d 950 (D. Del. 1953); Foote v. Public
Housing Com'r, 107 F. Supp. 270 (D. Mich. 1952).
98 See Henis v. Compania Agricola De Guatemala, supra note 97 at 226; Foote v. Public
Housing Com'r, supra note 97 at 273.
99 Fifth and Walnut v. Loew's Inc., 76 F. Supp. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 894 (1949).
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pleadings, because it was always clear that the first five defenses of rule
12(b) could be raised in that manner. Defense number seven, added
in 1946, can also be shown by affidavits or depositions. 00 In contrast to
a motion for summary judgment, the court has discretion in deciding
whether to receive matters outside the pleadings on a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim or for judgment on the pleadings. If such
matters are received, the motion is to be treated as one for a summary
judgment and, in order to prevent surprise, all parties are given a reason-
able opportunity to submit affidavits and other evidence.' As on the
determination of a motion for summary judgment, genuine questions of
fact arising on these motions may not be resolved without a trial.
Only the motions based on failure to state a claim and for judgment
on the pleadings are integrated with the summary judgment rule
because if they are sustained without leave to plead further, a judgment
on the merits results, whereas all of the defenses (except that numbered
(6)) do not go to the merits. It has been suggested that the motion to
strike, rule 12(f), be similarly converted into a motion for summary
judgment. 2
CONCLUSION
This article has not attempted to deal with the detailed problems of
any particular jurisdiction. Instead, an effort has been made to survey
the general field of pre-trial depositions, to answer some of the questions
posed by lawyers and litigants in general, and to form an overall picture
of the availability and applicability of the methods of avoiding a long
and expensive trial. While it is true that jurisdictions differ as to detail,
they are in accord as to theory-in that "justice delayed is justice
denied." 0 3
100 2 Moore, Federal Practice 2256 (1948).
101 Id. at 2256 n.23; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), 12(c). Judge Clark reports that the provision
for treating such motions as motions for summary judgment, which was introduced by the
1948 amendment to 12(b) and (c), seems to be working very well. Clark, Experience Under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Reporter's Summary of Suggestions, Criticisms and
Published Discussions 21 (May 1, 1953).
102 See Armstrong, supra note 92 at 345; Clark, op. cit. supra note 101 at 25.
103 For drafts of the rules proposed by the Advisory Committee on this subject, see
1957 Report of the Temporary Commission on the Courts (part III: First Preliminary
Report of the Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure), N.Y. Legis. Doc. (1957)
no. 6(b), at pp. 81-93, reprinted in McKinney's Session Law News of New York (April 10,
1957), at pp. a-384-92.
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